Introduction
Law faculty self-governance occurs largely through faculty committees, and that self-governance plays an integral role in academic freedom.
1 While most law faculty members vigorously defend their right to academic freedom and self-governance, for some that defense fails to translate into a willingness to fully engage in the committee work necessary to ensure meaningful selfgovernance. This is problematic on two fronts. First, by withdrawing from governance activities, we participate in the demise of academic freedomfreedom sustained by faculty activism, agreement and disagreement over institutional policies, initiative, and directions.
2 Second, the failure of some to do their fair share of committee work creates workload equity and social responsibility problems.
3
Because faculty self-governance is integral to the eff ective functioning of law schools, and because that self-governance requires productive committees, the "reward" for effi cient and strong faculty service work performance is often more service work. 4 The opposite is also true. Faculty members who demonstrate lack of competence or responsibility when engaging in committee work are not called upon to serve. How this plays out in our experience, and that of our colleagues at other law schools, is that some faculty members do signifi cantly more than others when it comes to the labor necessary to sustain and build their institutions.
The tendency of some to sit back and let others do the work when working in groups such as committees has a name: "social loafi ng." Often called the "free-rider" problem, 5 social loafi ng can lead to inequitable workloads, and, according to social cognition theorists, unchecked social loafi ng can have a spillover eff ect on those who do carry their fair share of the workload, as well as on those who traditionally pick up the slack for the loafers. 6 We suspect that social loafi ng is a well-recognized, if unnamed, phenomenon at many law schools. This phenomenon is particularly vexing because it has tangible career consequences. While the institution benefi ts from both committee workers and productive scholars, fi nancial, institutional, and career rewards rest largely on scholarly productivity. Socially responsible faculty members who fully engage in committee work help sustain a robust system of faculty governance. However, they do so at the expense of time available for their own scholarly pursuits. By ensuring the work gets done, they also provide some colleagues the freedom to disengage and focus on individual careerenhancing scholarly endeavors with no penalty and potentially signifi cant individual rewards. This can create signifi cant institutional inequities. The (forthcoming) (fi nding that female faculty perform signifi cantly more internal service than their male counterparts and noting that this fi nding raises equity issues in terms of salary diff erentials and overall success in academia). question is what to do about it. That question is all the more pressing given ongoing changes to the existing legal education model that require signifi cant faculty input and committee work in an era when many schools have seen a reduction in full-time faculty available to do that work.
7
In this article, we suggest that rather than conceding important decisionmaking to administrators or perpetuating a potentially unsustainable model of disparate service workload allocations, law schools need to explore ways to equitably allocate and encourage institutional service work.
8 This is especially important because sustained workload inequities, along with a system that neither rewards extraordinary work nor penalizes substandard work, can induce what is known as "the sucker eff ect." In other words, it can lead those who have traditionally carried the lion's share of the work to reduce the injustice of the situation by reducing their own level of eff ort.
9
One way to address the problem of inequitable committee workload contributions is to learn from the social cognition literature on social loafi ng. That literature addresses the causes of, and solutions to, inequitable group work contributions. Studies suggest that making group members' contributions visible and evaluable, via small committee size and committee work evaluations, reduces social loafi ng. 10 This article discusses both of those ideas and particularly looks at using committee work contribution evaluations to highlight communal responsibilities, set clear expectations, communicate that certain behaviors are valued and important, and motivate change by setting normative standards for committee work participation.
11 It also suggests another way to address workload inequities: rewarding committee workhorses with release time from committee work.
7.
See Part I discusses changes in legal education that likely will result in the need for more committee work as well as fewer full-time faculty available to do the work. It suggests that these changes will require a shift in the current laissezfaire approach taken with those faculty members who choose not to participate fully in committee work. Part II reviews the social cognition theory literature and, based on that literature, proposes two potential ways to mitigate social loafi ng on faculty committees: smaller committees and evaluation of committee work contributions. To help faculties envision what an evaluative instrument might look like, we provide a sample rubric in Appendix A. Part III suggests rewards for extraordinary committee work, including committee release time. It suggests that service work release time does not aff ect budgets and helps level the playing fi eld, ensuring those who provide extraordinary institutional service also have time to engage more fully in the scholarly endeavors that typically result in fi nancial and reputational rewards. In conclusion, the article notes that the legal academy is at a critical juncture that necessitates examining alternatives to the current committee workload allocation model to preserve our system of faculty governance and allow our institutions to thrive.
I. Addressing Faculty Members' Committee Work Performance:
Why Now?
Faculty participation in the direction of the law school is among the privileges, duties, and rights associated with academic freedom and faculty governance.
12 Faculty members play critical roles in defi ning and implementing institutional missions, strategic planning, curriculum, and numerous other decisions that aff ect the school's direction and educational focus. Most of this work is done via committees and task forces.
As legal education models change, most schools are experiencing an increase in faculty committee work responsibilities. Market forces are putting pressure on law schools to design, revise, innovate, create, and assess learning and to focus on the competencies students need to be successful in a changing legal services industry. Additionally, declining enrollment 13 When law schools innovate, reorganize, and evolve, faculty have two choices: continue a model of self-governance in which the faculty remains heavily involved in infl uencing, implementing, and assessing adaptations to their schools' educational programming model, or cede these decisions to law school and university administrators. Even if faculties choose the latter course, accreditation standards still require signifi cant faculty involvement in many institutional decisions. 15 For example, recently revised American Bar Association accreditation Standard 315 requires that the dean and the faculty "conduct ongoing evaluation of the law school's program of legal education, learning outcomes, and assessment methods" 16 and "use the results of this evaluation to determine the degree of student attainment of competency in the learning outcomes and to make appropriate changes to improve the curriculum." 17 The new accreditation standards create increased expectation for collective faculty committee service in areas in which the faculty as a whole are not currently expert. Moreover, faculty, via committees, will need to work with the administration to create and implement assessment systems for retrieving the necessary data and information to comply with the revised standards, without impinging on academic freedom.
18
The likely increase in committee service work is occurring at a time of shrinking full-time tenure or tenure-equivalent faculty hires, i.e., in the faculty who possess the privileges, duties, and rights of faculty governance. 19 All of higher education is experiencing shrinkage of tenure-track faculty, 20 and law schools are not immune to this phenomenon. 21 Law schools are taking a hard look at faculty numbers and costs as they attempt to manage their budget challenges in an era of declining admissions and escalating demands.
22 Some reductions in faculty have happened more quietly than others. 23 However, current trends suggest that nationwide, and certainly in many individual schools, there will be fewer full-time faculty 24 and more institutional work for those faculty members. This new reality suggests that continued reliance on the same subset of faculty to perform institutional service, and the laissez-faire approach toward those who do not fully participate, may be an unsustainable model. There will simply be too much work and too few people to perform that work. Moreover, those who have been willing to step up in the past, if now overburdened by even more unrewarded work and with even less time for scholarly endeavors, may rationally decide to withdraw from participating in a system that penalizes them for their institutional citizenship. 25 Thus, we suggest that to maintain a viable system of faculty governance, and to survive and thrive, law schools must fi nd ways to more equitably distribute service workloads.
II. Confronting Committee Workload Disparities

A. Institutional Structures that Foster Committee Workload Disparities
Full-time faculty jobs require engagement in scholarship, teaching, and service. While service is a communal undertaking, scholarship and teaching have traditionally been solitary activities resulting in individual achievements. 26 Promotions, institutional rewards, and faculty members' external reputations are largely based upon individual achievements, and particularly scholarly productivity rather than community engagement and service to the collective endeavor. 27 Thus, for some, there is little incentive to participate in institutionsustaining committee work. As long as colleagues do that work, the institution functions, and the individual faculty member can focus on work that reaps the most tangible rewards-i.e., scholarship.
A rational faculty member, concerned with his or her own advancement, may choose to underperform on service work knowing that such underperformance PSYCHOL. 819 (1983) (discussing how some group members, refusing to be "suckers," reduced their eff orts when others capable of contributing to the group did not do so); see also Schnake, supra note 9 (describing the "sucker eff ect"). and that less committee work means more time to engage in career-enhancing work, or just more time to spend with friends and family. A rational dean may choose a managerial strategy in which the same worker bees 29 are asked to perform the institutional labor because that strategy ensures the work will be done.
One oft-heard comment is that the reason for the diff erence in institutional workload allocation is that diff erent people have diff erent strengths: Some excel at scholarship, while others excel at teaching, and others perform exceptional service. The common wisdom is that a smart dean plays to his or her faculty members' strengths. 30 For many deans, this means assigning light committee workloads to prolifi c scholars, avoiding assigning important committee work to those who do it poorly or resist strongly, and assigning the heavy-lifting committee work to those who get that work done.
While prolifi c scholarship, great teaching, 31 and institutional service all benefi t the institution, the model for distributing committee workloads has real-world consequences for individual faculty members. Time to engage in scholarship, and hence greater scholarly productivity, often results in a wide range of internal and external rewards: course releases, merit raises, national reputations, and additional job prospects. 32 Those with signifi cant committee work responsibilities must either forgo time that otherwise would be spent on scholarship or work longer hours to achieve the same scholarly productivity levels as those colleagues with signifi cantly less committee work. For example, one study found that although both male and female undergraduate associate professors averaged a sixty-four-hour work week, institutional service work and other institutional commitments resulted in the women professors having 220 fewer hours than their male counterparts to devote to scholarly endeavors during the academic year. 33 That time diff erential can profoundly aff ect scholarly productivity.
28. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at n.43 (noting that those who underperform on committee work tend not to be asked to do time consuming important institutional labor because of a dean's fear that assigning those people to do the work will result in the work not getting done). When prolifi c scholars get course releases or other workload releases as a reward and incentive to continue their scholarly pursuits, the cycle of rewards accompanying scholarly productivity becomes self-perpetuating. Thus, the oft-heard justifi cation for light-loading some faculty members on committee work because they are prolifi c scholars should be looked at in light of the real-world advantages and disadvantages this produces for individual faculty members and its impact on the institution.
Eff orts to equalize workload distribution can provide institutions with valuable data to support or counter assumptions about whether the current model actually best serves the institution. For example, would more equitable committee workloads increase the scholarly productivity of the committee workhorses and thus enhance the institution's overall reputation? If the faculty wants to sustain a meaningful system of self-governance, how many "prolifi c scholars" who perform little or no institutional service can the institution continue to aff ord in light of changing demands by consumers, employers, and accreditors? These questions may be best answered by experimenting with changes to the status quo.
The need to explore new ways of committee work accountability may be especially pressing if schools fi nd that many of their current institutional service worker bees are baby boomers. These stalwarts of institutional labor will begin to retire. Studies suggest that younger generations of workers believe work is less central to their lives, and value leisure time and work/ life balance more than their baby boomer counterparts. 34 These generational diff erences may play a role in younger faculty members' willingness to engage in unrecognized and unrewarded institutional service contributions, and they may be particularly reluctant to pick up the slack for colleagues who choose not to engage in committee work.
With the likely increase in committee work, reduction in faculty available to do that work, and a new generation of faculty members potentially less willing to compensate for those who choose not to contribute, it is time to explore alternatives to the status quo. We suggest looking to social cognition literature for insights into how to create more equitable workload distributions and ensure a sustainable model of faculty governance in the changing landscape of legal education.
B. Social Loafing: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies
Committees often consist of members who perform the lion's share of the committee's work and those who do little to contribute to the committee's charged tasks. In this section, we discuss the social cognition theories (fi nding female associate undergraduate professors spent approximately 4.5 more hours per week on institutional service than their male counterparts). For a brief discussion of gender and racial inequities in service workload distribution, see infra note 69. underlying the choice to let one's colleagues carry the committee service workload, the negative consequences that fl ow from unchecked disparate group work contributions, and the lessons from social cognition theory on how to remedy inequitable service workloads.
Social cognition theorists coined the term "social loafi ng" to describe a reduction in eff ort when working on a joint product where one's work cannot be judged separately from the collective product. 35 Alternatively, when some believe their co-workers cannot be trusted to perform, they pick up the slack and do more than their fair share, resulting in what social cognition theorists call "social compensation."
36 Both social loafi ng and social compensation may cause resentment and frustration among those who believe that they carry more than their fair share of the committee workload. 37 Perceptions that coworkers are loafi ng may reduce the performance of other group members, thus resulting in a weaker group performance and product. 38 Sustained workload inequities, along with a system that neither rewards extraordinary work nor penalizes substandard work, also may lead those who have traditionally done more than others to reduce the injustice of the situation by reducing their own level of eff ort to avoid being "suckers." 39 Fortunately, based on studies of student work groups and multiple nonacademic workplaces, 40 39. For studies discussing the "sucker eff ect," i.e., the phenomenon in which an individual refuses to allow others to benefi t from his or her work and withdraws eff ort when he or she believes other capable group members consciously choose to withhold their eff ort, see Schnake, supra note 9; Kerr, supra note 25.
40. We review the literature with the caveat that most social loafi ng studies in academia have occurred in context of student work groups rather than among adult workers, and virtually no studies exist on the unique aspects of social loafi ng in context of academic committees. how to mitigate the problem. We focus on two particular solutions found in this literature, reducing committee size and evaluating committee service, because these changes can be implemented via concrete action steps. Other solutions to social loafi ng, such as working on intrinsically meaningful tasks, 41 feeling that one is making a unique, rather than redundant, contribution, 42 working with highly respected co-workers, 43 fulfi lling a sense of felt responsibility toward one's co-workers or the organization, 44 and working with highly cohesive groups 45 rely more on intrinsic motivation and, while useful to keep in mind when making committee assignments, are more challenging to implement systematically.
Carefully Choose Committee Size
Virtually all faculty members are appointed to committees. Committee workload disparities often have little to do with committee assignments. Instead, workload inequities arise based upon who actually does the work within the committee, as well as who is asked to take leadership roles, either formally as chair or informally because a person is known to get the work done.
Often, to spread the work and ensure a diversity of opinions, deans appoint relatively large faculty committees. 46 In doing so, deans may be unwittingly student work groups. Thus, we believe that despite the diff erences between student work groups and work groups in institutions outside academia, the studies are salient when it comes to faculty committee workload distribution and performance. We suggest that studies of the eff ectiveness of the methods discussed here when it comes to faculty committee work would be useful and informative. facilitating social loafi ng. Studies fi nd that the larger the group, the more likely social loafi ng will occur. 47 Large groups enable some individuals to hide in the crowd, avoiding the negative consequences of slacking off , and, at the other end of the spectrum, some do not contribute because they get lost in the crowd and do not get credit for the individual eff ort they expend. 48 Some feel a lack of accountability because withholding eff ort allows them to reap the same rewards as those who put in eff ort. 49 Others may be unwilling to exert eff ort if they believe that their eff ort adds little to the group product-i.e., to the extent their input is dispensable in terms of the fi nal product, their motivation to participate decreases even when their contribution is made identifi able. 50 It has even been suggested that "in some cases individuals may simply not be aware of the eff ort they are expending when part of a large group, and thus any reduction in eff ort may be unintentional." 51 One solution to social loafi ng is to appoint small committees. Small committees can increase feelings of individual accountability and make it easier to identify who is responsible for a positive outcome. Studies of teambased learning suggest ideal work group size ranges from two to seven people, depending upon the project. 52 However, no consensus exists about ideal workplace teams because workplace team size often depends on task and work environment. Additionally, concern about social loafi ng is just one of many considerations when forming work teams, such as faculty committees, because issues such as diversity of opinion, committee members' individual expertise and interest in the project, the scope of the committee's tasks, and other factors play a role in committee composition. Given these realities, if large committees are necessary, it may be useful to divide the work into tasks or projects that can be accomplished by smaller subcommittees.
Evaluate Committee Work
While small committees may help mitigate social loafi ng, small committees may not always be viable, and even within those committees some faculty members still may end up doing the lion's share of the work given the dynamics of the committee or the nature of the work. Thus, we suggest faculties and deans develop concrete ways to evaluate committee work.
Why evaluate? A concrete evaluative process indicates that committee work matters, and the evaluative process itself sets behavioral norms. Evaluating committee work performance signals a shift from the current laissez-faire attitude toward committee work contributions. As one study noted, evaluation puts behaviors in a team context, focuses attention on behaviors relevant to eff ective performance, communicates certain behaviors are valued and important, and motivates change by visibly demonstrating discrepancies between behaviors and standards. 53 What would a committee work evaluation look like? The answer to that question is a decision best left to individual faculties. However, to help faculties envision what such an evaluation might encompass, we provide a sample committee work contribution rubric [see Appendix A].
Another signifi cant question is: Who completes the evaluative rubric? Again, this question is best answered according to a particular law school's culture and circumstance. Committee members could self-assess, using a rubric such as that suggested in Appendix A, with committee chair input or review. Alternatively, in institutions where chairs wield persuasion, authority, and gravitas, committee chairs could be asked to complete the evaluation with an opportunity for the committee member to comment. A more radical, potentially more accurate, and admittedly more complex suggestion is that schools use a committee work rubric as the basis for a peer-evaluation model. 54 Even though the precise content and mechanism of committee work evaluations may be up for debate, it seems clear that assessing faculty contributions is useful. The literature makes clear that using a feedback instrument that contains behavioral items and expectations sends a message that performance should meet the prescribed standards and provides opportunities to learn about, and refl ect upon, one's own behaviors in relation to those standards. 55 Evaluations exert normative controls because of people's desire for belonging, a desire that motivates both compliance with and internalization of group standards.
56 A rubric such as the one provided in Appendix A sets up clear standards and expectations that individuals who care about their colleagues' good opinion will want to meet. 57 The evaluations also provide the dean and committee chairs with documented information for dialogue with traditional committee service shirkers-especially if a dean incorporates the evaluations into the formal year-end evaluations. For all these reasons, an evaluative process hopefully deepens the pool of citizens from which to assign work. However, whether the process actually changes the existing culture largely depends upon faculties' willingness to engage in the process and deans' use of information from the evaluations.
As with any change to longtime practice in a culture such as academia, 58 schools considering evaluating committee work and thus creating an accountability system for institutional service work must grapple with resistance to change and resistance to accountability structures. They also must address concerns about human behaviors when it comes to both evaluating and being evaluations improved performance as measured by objective expert ratings). In an academic setting, peer review of committee work contributions raises complex issues such as potential disruption of workplace camaraderie and morale and concerns about the validity of the process because of potential friendship bias or unwillingness to identify noncontributors, especially if those noncontributors will be voting on tenure or promotion. Those concerns would need to be addressed by faculties who seek to engage in peer review evaluations of committee work contributions. evaluated. 59 To the extent faculty are resistant to accountability structures, allowing for self-evaluation, with some level of input from committee chairs, may be the way to balance concerns about heavy-handedness on the part of the administration with the need to institute some form of committee work contribution accountability.
Finally, while an evaluative process has the potential to improve committee workload performance by setting norms and expectations, evaluations of committee work contributions may have a limited impact if a dean is not willing to use the evaluations to reward outstanding citizens 60 and to develop a plan of improvement for those who are not meeting their service obligations. For some deans, a willingness to engage in meaningful service work evaluation may hinge upon whether faculty members really want the dean to reward outstanding service and discipline those who repeatedly refuse to contribute to the collective endeavor. For others, it may rest upon diff erent calculations. For example, is a dean willing to address in a constructive manner substandard service performance, especially if the faculty member is an outstanding scholar or teacher? Thus, to some extent, whether a concrete assessment of committee work contributions eff ectuates change may be a function of both culture and leadership.
Reward Outstanding Committee Work with a Release from Future Committee Work
While service work theoretically is part of every faculty member's job description and thus theoretically compensated, reality does not match theory. As discussed earlier, the current system incentivizes scholarly productivity. Faculty members may lose their jobs for failure to publish and often get 59. To the extent the evaluation involves input from committee chairs or involves other forms of peer evaluation, faculties might benefi t from training on how to give and receive feedback, given that many faculty members have had no 60. The rational theory of motivation suggests that when rewards are attached to performance, to the extent one recognizes that an evaluation will help determine those rewards, individuals are motivated to "pursue goals endorsed by whoever determines the rewards and to omit behaviors that detract from obtaining those rewards." Stewart et al., supra note 54, at 436. salary increases and course releases for well-placed and prolifi c publication.
61
Some schools also reward outstanding teaching, although generally not to the same extent as outstanding scholarship. Currently, at many law schools, no signifi cant tangible reward or remuneration exists for outstanding service, 62 nor is one penalized for poor or nonexistent service. In this section, we suggest deans change the paradigm. Instead of "rewarding" outstanding service work with additional service work, we propose that deans reward institutional committee worker bees by giving them less service work via committee work release time.
63
Given tight budgets and other institutional and university structures, meaningful fi nancial remuneration may not be a viable reward for outstanding institutional service. However, deans could reward those who take on the lion's share of committee work with more time for scholarship so that they can reap the institutional rewards that frequently hinge upon scholarly productivity.
64
The traditional way to create time is to award course releases. Teaching in law schools involves not only the hours spent in the classroom, but prep time, keeping abreast of new case law, and working with individual students or groups of students during offi ce hours. Faculty members who are given a reduced course load are able to increase the time devoted to scholarship. However, a course release may not be viable given curricular needs and in light (noting that service is expected but not valued and, in fact, the promotion and tenure processes punish faculty members who do so much service that it hinders their publishing and teaching eff ectiveness); Silverman, supra note 32, at 366-67 (describing some of the external and internal rewards available to productive scholars and noting that this reward structure often promotes scholarship over teaching).
62. Some exceptions to this general rule exist. For example, Albany Law School grants a Faculty Excellence in Service award annually at graduation, an award accompanied by a small fi nancial remuneration.
63. Deans could consider other rewards such as fi nancial remuneration, or even creative rewards such as prime parking spots. However, those rewards fail to address the equity issues created by the time diff erentials required of those asked to perform signifi cant institutional service. We note that service encompasses a wide range of categories, including (a) law school and university committee work and faculty governance service; (b) service to students; (c) law school or university project development and management; (d) administrative service as deans and program directors; (e) community service and outreach; and (f) professional service and leadership. See Clausen, supra note 8, at 238. While administrative, community, and professional service are all valuable, that service work can have career-enhancing eff ects. On the other hand, internal institutional service work goes largely unrewarded, and can actually have a detrimental impact on one's career. See Guarino & Borden, supra note 3. Thus, to remedy some of the inequities discussed throughout the article, we suggest an assessment structure that focuses on faculty committee service and rewarding extraordinary service with the luxury of time.
64. See supra note 27 (discussing rewards that accompany scholarly productivity).
of the current and anticipated reduction in full-time faculty discussed earlier. 65 Moreover, and in some situations, if one has been assigned a heavy committee burden that involves numerous tasks and requires signifi cant attention, a course release may not provide the blocks of time that facilitate scholarship.
Thus we suggest a low-cost reward for extraordinary service: committee release time. 66 A reward structure for outstanding service work, such as a year with no committee assignments, potentially could motivate some faculty members who do a moderate amount of work to more fully engage in service work, and it may help those who do the lion's share of the work continue to stay engaged rather than withdraw from what they perceive to be an inequitable system. 67 We acknowledge that committee work release presents deans with a dilemma: If they relieve their best workers of committee work, will the work get done? That is the issue that underlies the common problem that the "reward for committee work well done is more committee work." Deans go to the people they know will get the work done because of the potential consequences of assigning the work to those who don't do it. We believe that institutions, and deans, should not sweep under the carpet the ethical issues raised by a system that places largely unrewarded service work burdens upon some so that others have more free time to engage in the scholarly work that garners tangible benefi ts both inside and outside a given institution. As we discussed in section II, supra, rewarding prolifi c scholars with more time for scholarship, while "rewarding" strong committee workers with more committee work and thus less time for scholarship, creates real-world inequities. 68 Ignoring the unfairness of the current structure is particularly problematic when that model raises gender and racial equity issues. 69 While this article recommends potential rewards for extraordinary contributions, we would be remiss if we did not suggest that deans consider penalties for a pattern of substandard service work contributions. In today's world, deans cannot ignore the fact that some faculty members do not engage in institutional committee work, nor can they continue to count on the worker bees to get all the work done. Thus, the idea of committee work rewards goes hand in hand with creating committee work participation accountability structures, such as institutionalized committee work evaluations. These evaluations create behavioral norms and hopefully voluntarily enhance faculty committee work participation. However, they also provide deans with documentation that enables them to reward outstanding citizens and confront those who consistently fail to carry their fair share of the workload.
Conclusion
Evidence suggests there will be an increase in faculty committee work demands and fewer people available to do that work. In an era of enhanced accreditation burdens and market force restructuring 70 that require more committee work, faculties and deans must address committee workload inequities if they wish to maintain a robust system of faculty self-governance and avoid institutional stagnation. This article presents ideas that serve as a starting point for exploring how schools might preserve a robust system of faculty governance while also addressing the inequitable workload allocations and reward systems that exist at many institutions.
women, people of color, and particularly women of color). It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the gender and racial inequities in service work allocations. While we hope that some proposals in this article lessen overall faculty committee workload disparities, we recognize that to fully counter gender and racial service workload inequities, additional issues must be confronted and addressed.
70. See supra Part I (discussing changes in legal education that likely will result in the need for additional institutional service). 
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